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 
Abstract—In this article we describe the SHA-3 algorithm and 
its internal permutation in which potential weaknesses are hidden.  
The hash algorithm can be used for different purposes, such as 
pseudo-random bit sequences generator, key wrapping or one pass 
authentication, especially in weak devices (WSN, IoT, etc.). 
Analysis of the function showed that successful preimage attacks 
are possible for low round hashes, protection from which only 
works with increasing the number of rounds inside the function. 
When the hash function is used for building lightweight 
applications, it is necessary to apply a small number of rounds, 
which requires additional security measures. This article proposes 
a variant improved hash function protecting against preimage 
attacks, which occur on SHA-3. We suggest using an additional 
external randomness sources obtained from a lightweight PRNG 
or from application of the source data permutation.  
 
Keywords—hash function, SHA-3, Keccak, preimage attack, 
lightweight cryptography. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE family of functions, called SHA-3 (Secure Hash 
Algorithm-3) is based on Keccak [1], the algorithm that 
NIST selected as the winner of the public SHA-3 Cryptographic 
Hash Algorithm Competition. The SHA-3 family consists of 
four hash functions and two extendable-output functions. SHA-
3 constitutes a structure named the sponge construction; 
functions with this structure are called sponge functions.  
The permutation is specified as an instance of a family of 
permutations, called KECCAK-f, to provide the flexibility to 
modify its size and security parameters in the development of 
any additional modes.  
II. SHA-3 ALGORITHM  
The Keccak hash function makes use of the sponge 
construction, as depicted in Fig. 1. Keccak has two main 
parameters: 𝑟 (bitrate) and 𝑐 (capacity). The sum of those two 
parameters makes the state size, which Keccak operates on. 
Different values for bitrate and capacity give trade-offs between 
speed and security. A higher bitrate gives a faster function at the 
expense of lower security. In the SHA -3 proposal, the state size 
is 1600 bits. The function uses two phase processing, see Fig. 1. 
The initial state is filled with zeros. In the first phase, absorbing, 
the state is processed by consecutive applications of the 
permutation Keccak-f. When all message blocks have been 
processed, the first phase is finished and the second begins, 
called squeezing phase. The first r bits of the state are returned 
as part of the output bits, interleaved with applications of the 
permutation Keccak-f. The second phase is finished after the 
desired length of the output has been produced, see [1].  
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Fig.1. The sponge construction [4]  
 
The value of the parameter c is equal to the hash length 
multiplied by 2. Keccak can operate on smaller states, for 
examples 𝑏{25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}, where 𝑏 is the 
width of the permutation. The Keccak-f permutations are 
iterated construction consisting of a sequence of almost 
identical rounds. The number of rounds 𝑛𝑟 depends on the 
permutation width and is given by 𝑛𝑟 = 12 + 12𝑙, where 2𝑙 =
𝑏/25. This gives 24 rounds for Keccak-f[1600]. A Keccak-f 
round consists of a sequence of invertible steps, each step 
operating as an array 𝑨 of 5 × 5 lanes; the length of lanes is 
𝑤{1,2,4,8,16,32,64} (𝑏 = 24𝑤). For Keccak-f[1600] with 
𝑐 = 1024 and 𝑟 = 576, we have 𝑟 + 𝑐 = 1600.  
In the rest of this section we present a specification of the 
Keccak round function (following the authors’ specification and 
the FIPS Standard) underlying effect of each map constituting it 
on state bits transformations. Thus, the round is defined as:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑨, 𝑅𝐶)  =  𝜄(𝜒(𝜋(𝜌(𝜃(𝑨)))), 𝑅𝐶). 
 
The pseudo-code of a single round (with a round constant 
𝑅𝐶) starts in Fig.2, where the first step θ is presented (see [2]). 
 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑨, 𝑅𝐶) { 
𝜃 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝  
𝐶[𝑥]  =  𝐴[𝑥, 0]  ⊕  𝐴[𝑥, 1]  ⊕  𝐴[𝑥, 2]  
⊕  𝐴[𝑥, 3]  ⊕  𝐴[𝑥, 4],                                                     
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4)  
𝐷[𝑥]  =  𝐶[𝑥 − 1]  ⊕  𝑟𝑜𝑡(𝐶[𝑥 + 1],1), 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑥 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4)  
𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦]  =  𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦]  ⊕  𝐷[𝑥],                                           
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4,0. . .4) 
Fig.2. Pseudo-code of  𝜃 step.  
 
The 𝜃 map is linear and aimed at diffusion; it is translation-
invariant in all directions. Its effect can be described as follows: 
it adds to each bit 𝑎[𝑥][𝑦][𝑧] the bitwise sum of the parities of 
two columns: that of 𝑎[𝑥 − 1][·][𝑧] and that of 𝑎[𝑥 +  1][·
][𝑧 − 1]. A consequence of this is CP-kernel or column parity 
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kernel. Without 𝜃, the Keccak-f round function would not 
provide diffusion of any significance. Thanks to the interaction 
with 𝜒 (see Fig. 5) each bit at the input of a round potentially 
affects 31 bits at its output and each bit at the output of a round 
depends on 31 bits at its input. Note that without the translation 




𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4,0. . .4)  
𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦]  =  𝑟𝑜𝑡(𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦], 𝑟[𝑥, 𝑦]), 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4,0. . .4) 
𝐵[𝑦, 2 ∗ 𝑥 + 3 ∗ 𝑦]  =  𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦], 
Fig.3. Pseudo-code of 𝜌 step  
 
The map 𝜌 (see Fig.3) consists of translations within the 
lanes aimed at providing inter-slice dispersion. Without it, 
diffusion between the slices would be very slow. It is 
translation-invariant in the z-direction. The inverse of 𝜌 is the 
set of lane translations, where the constants are the same, but the 
direction is reversed. 
 
𝜋 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝  
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4,0. . .4)  
𝐵[𝑦, 2 ∗ 𝑥 + 3 ∗ 𝑦]  =  𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦] 
Fig.4. Pseudo-code of  𝜋 step   
 
The map π (see Fig.4) is a transposition of the lanes that 
provides dispersion aimed at long-term diffusion. Without it, 
Keccak-f would exhibit periodic trails of low weight. 𝜋 operates 
in a linear way on the coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦): the lane in position 
(𝑥, 𝑦) goes to position (𝑥, 𝑦)𝑀𝑇, with 𝑀 =  [
0 1
2 3
 ] being a 
2 × 2 matrix with elements in 𝐺𝐹(5). It follows that the lane in 
the origin (0,0) does not change position. As 𝜋 operates on the 
slices independently, it is translation-invariant in the z-direction. 
The inverse of 𝜋 is defined by 𝑀−1. Many matrices could be 
used for 𝜋. In fact, the invertible 2 × 2 matrices with elements 
in 𝐺𝐹(5) with the matrix multiplication form a group with 480 
elements containing elements of order 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 
20 and 24. Each of these matrices defines a permutation on the 
6 axes, and equivalently, on the 6 directions. Thanks to its 
linearity, the 5 positions on an axis are mapped to 5 positions on 
an axis (not necessarily the same). Similarly, the 5 positions that 
are on a line parallel to an axis, are mapped to 5 positions on a 
line parallel to the axis, see [1].  
 
𝜒 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝  
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑖𝑛 (0. . .4,0. . .4)  
𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦]  =  𝐵[𝑥, 𝑦]  ⊕  ((¬ 𝐵[𝑥 + 1, 𝑦]) ∧   𝐵[𝑥 + 2, 𝑦]) 
Fig.5. Pseudo-code of χ step 
 
𝜒 (see Fig.5) is the only nonlinear map in Keccak-f. 
Without it, the Keccak-f round function would be linear. It 
constitutes the parallel application of 5𝑤 S-boxes operating on 
5-bit rows. 𝜒 is translation-invariant in all directions and has 
algebraic degree two. This has consequences for its differential 
propagation and correlation properties, see [1], [2], [3].  
 
𝜄 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝  
𝐴[0,0]  =  𝐴[0,0]  ⊕  𝑅𝐶 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐴 } 
Fig.6. Pseudo-code of 𝜄 step  
The map 𝜄 (see Fig.6) consists of the addition of round 
constants and is aimed at disrupting symmetry. Without it, the 
round function would be translation-invariant in the z direction 
and all rounds of Keccak-f would be equal making it subject to 
attacks exploiting symmetry, such as slide attacks. The number 
of active bit positions of the round constants, i.e., the bit 
positions in which the round constant can differ from 0, is 𝑙 +
 1. As 𝑙 increases, the round constants add more and more 
asymmetry. The bits of the round constants are different from 
round to round and are taken as the output of a maximum-length 
LFSR. The constants are only added in a single lane of the state. 
Because of this, the disruption diffuses through 𝜃 and 𝜒 to all 
lanes of the state after a single round, see [1].  
All the operations on the indices are done modulo 5. 𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦] 
denotes a lane in that state and 𝐴 denotes the complete 
permutations state array. The constants 𝑟[𝑥, 𝑦] are the rotations 
offsets, where 𝑅𝐶 are the round constants.  𝑟𝑜𝑡(𝑊, 𝑚) is the 
usual bitwise rotation operation, moving bit at position 𝑖 into 
position 𝑖 + 𝑚 in the lane 𝑊. 𝜃 is a linear operation that 
provides diffusion to the hash state. 𝜌 mixes bits of a lane using 
the rotation and 𝜋 permutes lanes. 𝜒 is the only non-linear 
operation, 𝜄 calculates XOR of the round constant with the first 
lane, see [2].  
III. APPLICATIONS BASED ON THE DUPLEX CONSTRUCTION  
Cryptographic hash functions are fundamental components 
in different information security applications, such as digital 
signature generation and verification, key derivation, and 
pseudorandom bit generators. In this section we briefly present 
known applications, where Keccak-like functions, especially in 
the lightweight form, have been applied or could be applied for 
security solutions. The duplex construction can be used as a 
pseudo-random bit sequence generator [5], key wrapping tool 
[6] or one pass authenticated encryption algorithms [6]. Key 
wrapping can provide the assurance of integrity of data and the 
confidentiality of cryptographic keys or other data. 
Authenticated encryption used a duplex function by including a 
secret key in the input. If the duplex function behaves like a 
random oracle, the keyed duplex function behaves as a random 
function to anyone not knowing the key but having access to the 
duplex function.  
One more important possible application of SHA-3 is hash 
cash, what in the future bitcoin might be applied. Because the 
SHA-1 is already broken and SHA-2 is of a similar design, that 
there was a problem with collisions for the older hash functions 
and SHA-3 fixes this. For hashcash-SHA-3 is that, there is some 
debate [7] within the NIST comments process on the proposal 
of weakening SHA-3's resistance to preimage attacks down to 
128-bit (vs the full hash size, as with previous hashes). The aim 
is a small performance gain with the rationale that some hash-
pluggable algorithms do not rely on full-length preimage 
resistance, which we propose to improve.  
There are also cryptanalytic risks. A practical issue with 
switching to hashcash-SHA-3 is that it would invalidate all 
existing ASIC mining hardware and so is a change that would 
unlikely to be made. 
One likely side-effect, however, would be that it would 
introduce more memory or pre-computation tradeoffs, which 
could make ASICs unprofitable or give advantages to people 
with large resources to do the pre-computations. Pre-
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computation advantages would be a motivation to replace the 
hash with SHA-3. 
IV. ATTACKS ON THE ALGORITHM AND PROPERTIES 
EXPLOITED IN ATTACKS  
The six SHA-3 functions are designed to provide special 
properties, such as resistance to collisions, preimage, and 
second preimage attacks [8], [9], [10]. 
Criteria are laid by developers for permutation is to have no 
properties that can be exploited in a shortcut attack when being 
used in the sponge construction: bit-oriented structure; bitwise 
logical operations and fixed rotations, symmetry, parallelism, 
round degree 2, matryoshka structure, eggs in another basket, 
see [1].  
Now consider the properties used in the attacks, which are 
described detail in the paper [11]. The preimage attack 
presented in [11] exploits two properties of 𝜃[12]. The first one 
is the CP-kernel or the column parity kernel. CP-kernel allows 
to stay in very low Hamming weight difference state through the 
first round. The second property is the observation that either all 
5 bits in each column are left unchanged or all 5 are flipped (the 
authors used in the 4-round preimage attack), see [1].  
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 =  0 𝑡𝑜 4 𝑑𝑜  
𝐶[𝑥]  =  𝑎[𝑥, 0]  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 =  1 𝑡𝑜 4 𝑑𝑜 
𝐶[𝑥]  =  𝐶[𝑥] ⊕ 𝑎[𝑥, 𝑦]  
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 =  0 𝑡𝑜 4 𝑑𝑜 
𝐷[𝑥]  =  𝐶[𝑥 − 1] ⊕ 𝑅𝑂𝑇(𝐶[𝑥 +  1],1)  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 =  0 𝑡𝑜 4 𝑑𝑜  
𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦]  =  𝑎[𝑥, 𝑦] ⊕ 𝐷[𝑥]  
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟  
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Fig.7. Properties of θ: transformation from the cube to a rectangle  
 
Without 𝜃, the Keccak-f round function would not provide 
diffusion of any significance. Its effect can be described as 
follows (using transformation of data presented in Fig.7): it adds 
to each bit 𝑎[𝑥][𝑦][𝑧] the bitwise sum of the parities of two 
columns: that of 𝑎[𝑥 − 1][·][𝑧] and that of 𝑎[𝑥 +  1][·][𝑧 − 1]. 
A consequence of this is CP-kernel or column parity kernel.  
The following describes the difference between the 
Keccak-f[1600] permutation and a purely random permutation. 
Further analyzing we trace XOR differences between 
corresponding bits from two states. 'Active' bit is a bit with 
difference 1 and 'inactive' with difference 0, see [11]. We need 
paths, which work with probability 1. We choose differential 
path starts with 4 active bits such as two of them are in a column 
and the other two active are in other column, for two reasons: 
the difference state is in the CP-kernel and after first 𝜃 there are 
still only 4 active bits; we need a family of differential paths 
from which we can construct other paths by changing the 
columns with active bits, see [11].  
First three steps (𝜃, 𝜌, 𝜋) of a round are linear and a 
calculation, how differences change after these steps is simple. 
At the 4th step (𝜒 step) we must calculate the non-linear function 
𝑦 = 𝑥1⨁𝑥2𝑥3. If 𝑥2 or 𝑥3 is an active or unknown bit, the output 
difference is unknown. Hence, this bit is marked as ‘unknown’. 
The last step is 𝜄; it calculated XOR of the first lane with a round 
constant and does not affect non-linearity. According to this 
description, in Fig.8 is illustrated the differential path. Instead, 
5 × 5 matrix of lanes there are 25 rows, each representing a 
single lane (64 bits). Unknown bits start to appear after 𝜒 in the 
1st round. They are spread through the state in the 2nd round 
and their number is substantial in the end of the 2nd round. In 
the 3rd round 𝜒 changes useful bits to unknown bits. There are 
more differential paths like the one presented in Fig. 8. A family 









Fig.8. Differential path used in the preimage attack. 
 
V. ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK 
As it is mentioned, in the attacks presented above the 
properties of 𝜃 have been exploited. In this paper we propose to 
make additional changes after the operation 𝜃 as a 
countermeasure to make impossible knowing all differences in 
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each column. The improved full round function is being 
constructed with adding logical operation XOR with some 
binary block after 𝜃 step, according to CP-kernel in 𝜃 
permutation. In the proposed operation, we can use a sequence 
of pseudo-random binary blocks obtained from an external 
source, see Fig. 9. In this section we consider three possible 
solutions. 
Fig. 9 illustrates Algorithm 1 for the case, where we use the 
addition operation after 𝜃; specifically, we use operation XOR. 
In this scheme symbols 𝑃0, 𝑃1, … 𝑃𝑛 are used to denote the output 
binary blocks (of appropriate length) of some external Pseudo-
Random Number Generator (PRNG) or HMAC. Application of 
such an additional operation protects the hash algorithm against 
attacks in a manner described in the papers [13] and [14]. Such 
a solution is the simplest one but to satisfy our expectations, it 
requires application of an external PRNG of good quality and of 
low computational overhead.  
 
ρ π χ  τ 
Ρ1 
θ  













Fig.9. Algorithm 1: using external PRNG. 
In the next Algorithm 2, illustrated in Fig. 10, we use a 
similar approach, which is used to remove the vulnerability. 
Here we additionally insert an internal operation, the purpose of 
which is pseudo-random selecting a range of data and then 
changing the data after the operation 𝜃 via XOR operation. In 
Algorithm 1 we generate a sequence of texts 𝑃0, 𝑃1, … 𝑃𝑛  from 
the sequence of messages 𝑀0||𝑀1|| … || 𝑀𝑛 by a permutation: a 
fixed one or pseudo-random, obtained from an external source 
of randomness (some PRNG). In this case we save a calculation 
overhead, because at each pass of the algorithm we need only 
random permutation of 𝑛 numbers instead of 𝑛 binary blocks of 
the length depending on the size of the blocks of SHA-3.  
 
ρ π χ  τ 
Ρ1 
θ  












Mn    
P0  P1  P.. Pn  
M0  M1  M.. Mn  
 
Fig. 10. Algorithm 2: Improved hash function with the addition of a 
pseudo randomness chosen from a data block 
Our last proposition is Algorithm 3, illustrated in Fig. 11. 
In this algorithm the original SHA-3 round is modified with 
application of a pseudo-random generator like those used in the 
Petra-2 hash function, see [15]. This approach also makes 
impossible the attack of the preimage type, proposed and 
considered earlier in papers [11], [13], [16], [17]. Perta-2 is a 
Merkle-Damgard type hash function using in its compression 
function a simple PRNG. The aim of this generator is to 
calculate a permutation of 16 numbers: 1,2, … ,16, which are 
stored in table 𝑍 = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖16}, see [11], which defines 
indexes of mixed subblocks of the internal state data block. 
Thus, in our Algorithm 3, we propose in each round iteration of 
SHA-3, after 𝜃 operation, XOR a pseudo-random binary block 
obtained from the input data block by permutation of its 
subblocks according to the table 𝑍. An advantage of such a 
solution, like in Algorithm 2, is that it has low computational 
overhead for randomness generation. Another advantage is that 
it does not need any externat PRNG.  
 
P0(H0M0 ) 
M0  M1  M.. Mn  
H0  P1(H1M1 ) P..(H..M.. ) Pn(HnMn ) 
H1 H1 H..
ρ π χ  τ 
Ρ1 
θ  












Mn    
Hn
 
Fig. 11. Algorithm 3: Improved hash function with application of the 
Petra-2-like PRNG.  
Validation of the proposed modified algorithms requires 
checking at least their computational effectiveness and verifying 
randomness of their outputs. Statistical properties of hash 
outputs can be checked out with NIST suite of tests [18].  
However, in this paper we restrict our analysis to analyzing 
possible statistical dependencies of the output of pure SHA-3 
rounds and the rounds modified with adding a binary sequence 
after the operation 𝜃. Numerical results of such an analysis is 
presented in Section VI.  
 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Based on the Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 described in this article 
and on the scheme, in which it was modified the SHA-3 standard 
algorithm, several generated sets of data have been tested and 
analyzed. The idea of tests is the following. We introduced the 
block of data after the 𝜃 step to XOR it with 𝜃 output. The block 
𝑃𝑖  has been changing from 0 to 15. The purpose of calculations 
was to show, how the obtained hash value (or, more precisely, 
the round output) changes for three different hash inputs, 
changing 𝑃𝑖  blocks and for growing number of rounds. First, we 
used the Hamming weight to measure a “randomness” of the 
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output data changing with 𝑃𝑖   changes. Next, we calculated the 
Hamming distance of input and output data to estimate changes 
of “correlation” between data blocks after hash transformation, 
for growing number of rounds. The full number of rounds that 
have been analyzed is 24 but, in this section, we show only the 
most representative results.  
As the hash input block, we used three variants of the 
buffer: a sequence of zeros, named “empty” in further analysis, 
a binary representation of four numbers “0”, “1”, “2” and “3”, 
named “0123”, and a binary representation of four letters “w”, 
“o”, “r” and “d”, named “word”. Below in Fig.12a, Fig.12b, 
Fig.12c, Fig.12d, Fig.12e an evolution of the Hamming weight 
of the hash changed in the manner described above, for the 
buffer “empty” and for different number of rounds: 1, 2, 3, 5, 
and 24. In Fig.13a, Fig.13b, Fig.13c, Fig.13d, Fig.13e    
analogous changes of the Hamming weight are presented for the  
buffer “0123” and for different number of rounds: 1, 2, 3, 5, and 
24. Finally, we also investigated the buffer “word” in the 
identical experiment, but the graphs obtained do not contain 
specific trends or other important dependencies and therefore 
they are not shown in plots. 
 
 
Fig. 12a. Hamming weight. 1 round. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 12b. Hamming weight. 2 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 12c. Hamming weight. 3 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 12d. Hamming weight. 5 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 12e. Hamming weight. 24 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 13a. Hamming weight. 1 round. Buffer – “0123”. 
 
 
Fig. 13b. Hamming weight. 2 rounds. Buffer – “0123”. 
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Fig. 13d. Hamming weight. 5 rounds. Buffer – “0123”. 
 
 
Fig. 13e. Hamming weight. 24 rounds. Buffer – “0123”. 
 
The next two series of figures contain results presenting 
changes of the Hamming distance for our texts. In Fig.14a, 
Fig.14b, Fig.14c, Fig.14d, Fig.14e, an evolution of the  
Hamming distance between the original SHA-3 round and the 
hash changed in the manner described above, for the buffer 
“empty” and for different number of rounds: 1, 2, 3, 5, and 24. 
The next series of figures, Fig.15a, Fig.15b, Fig.15c, Fig.15d, 
Fig.15e, present the analogous Hamming distance for the buffer 
“0123” for different number of rounds: 1, 2, 3, 5, and 24. 
Similarly to the above described, we also investigated the 
Hamming distance for the buffer “word” in an identical 
experiment, but the graphs obtained do not contain significant  
tendencies or dependencies and therefore they are not shown. 
 
 
Fig. 14a. Hamming distance. 1 round. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 14b. Hamming distance. 2 rounds. Buffer – “empty” 
 
 
Fig. 14c. Hamming distance. 3 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 14d. Hamming distance. 5 rounds. Buffer – “empty”.  
 
 
Fig. 14e. Hamming distance. 24 rounds. Buffer – “empty”. 
 
 
Fig. 15a. Hamming distance. 1 round. Buffer – “0123”. 
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Fig. 15e. Hamming distance. 24 rounds. Buffer – “0123”.  
 
In each experiment we considered 512-bit blocks, so such 
binary blocks can be considered as “random” if the number of 
“0” bits and “1” bits is approximately equal or do not differ too 
much. So, such an equivalence number of bits is 256. Results 
presented in the plots could be summarized as:  
• For large number of rounds (e.g., 24) the hash output 
is pseudorandom even if the input buffer is very 
specific, independently if we modify the round 
function with a pseudorandom inclusion. 
• For a small number of rounds adding extra randomness 
after the operation 𝜃 can have significant influence for 
some specific input blocks. It has small effect if the 
input block is pseudorandom (this results from out 
experiment with the buffer “word”).  
• There is a border number of iterations of a round (it 
could be 3 or 4) where the effect of included internal 
randomness rapidly decreases.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on SHA-3 standard and the permutation described in 
it, is proposed a new type of the construction, where to the 
original SHA-3 structure an additional randomness source is 
included. A new approach should provide additional strength for 
preimage and collision attacks. This scheme is adding a pseudo-
random data block after diffusion operation in the round 
permutation and reduces the ability to predict variables after the 
first round. In this work we analyzed SHA-3, which is based on 
Keccak, the algorithm that NIST selected as a winner of the 
public SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition 
[19]. Next, we described parameters of the Keccak hash 
function, which make it possible to manage speed and security 
of the sponge construction. These parameters affect the size of 
permutation, which is the basis of the sponge construction. The 
function uses two phase processing: absorbing and squeezing 
phase. We referred to the pseudo-code of a single round of 
Keccak, which contains this permutation. Security of the sponge 
construction also depends of the number of rounds. One round 
consists of five operations:  𝜃, 𝜌, 𝜋, 𝜒, 𝜄. This pseudo-code 
describes in detail the effect of these operations on the properties 
of the sponge construction, such as: diffusion, inter-slice 
dispersion, long term diffusion, nonlinear mapping and 
disrupting a symmetry. Cryptographic hash functions are 
fundamental components in a variety of information security 
application, such as digital signatures generation and 
verification, key derivation and pseudorandom bit generation. 
We briefly considered the following literature results. The 
duplex construction can be used as a pseudo-random bit 
sequence generator [6], key wrapping [13] or components of 
one pass authenticated encryption algorithms [13], [15]. The six 
SHA-3 functions are designed to provide special properties, 
such as resistance to collision, preimage, and second preimage 
attacks, c.f. [1], [11], [17], [20]. Design criteria laid by the 
developers for the permutation are to have no properties that can 
be exploited in a shortcut attack, when being used in the sponge 
construction: a bit-oriented structure; bitwise logical operations 
and fixed rotations, symmetry, parallelism, round degree 2, 
matryoshka structure, eggs in another basket, etc., see [1], [17], 
[21]. Then, in our considerations we followed an analysis of a 
permutation, which helps to evaluate the weak points of the 
Keccak function, which is exactly inside this permutation. We 
considered the properties used in the attacks and highlighted 
those used in the attack, such as CP-kernel, and observed the 
behavior of the state's bits, what is confirmed by the references 
to the work, see [12], [16]. In the preimage attack, used by [22], 
there were exploited two properties of 𝜃. The first one is the CP-
kernel or column parity kernel. The CP-kernel allows to stay in 
a very low Hamming weight difference to state through the first 
round. The second property is the observation that either all 5 
bits in each column are left unchanged or all 5 are flipped (the 
authors used them in the 4-round preimage attack, see [2], [22], 
[14]). As mentioned above, in the attacks there were used the 
properties 𝜃. Therefore, to prevent such attacks we proposed to 
make additional block data changes after the operation 𝜃. 
Consequently, it would make impossible to know all the 
differences in each data column. We proposed to improve the 
full round of Keccak in three algorithms: Algorithm 1, 2, and 3. 
A new approach should provide additional strength for the 
preimage and the collision attacks.  
The main observation of the paper was the effect of the 
number of rounds used in the sponge function. If the number is 
small, then successfully implemented attacks are possible. They 





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415
166 S. ONOPA, Z. KOTULSKI 
 
devices, where SHA-3 with only a small number of rounds can 
be applied. Also, looking to the future, it must be assumed the 
rapid development of algorithms that allow to use this type of 
attacks with many rounds. Having all the above, we proposed 
building and developing additional protection against the 
preimage attack. These countermeasures would remove the 
weak spots inside the round function, detailed CP-kernel and 
further.  
We proposed inserting an additional operation after the 
permutation 𝜃, using three versions of modifications used in this 
scheme. First, we used after the first permutation XOR of an 
output of some pseudorandom bitstream generator (possibly a 
secret key, what results with a new HMAC construction). In the 
second case we proposed using a pseudorandom permutation of 
the input data blocks. The third scheme assumed using elements 
of an additional algorithm, which is Petra-2-like pseudorandom 
permutation to provide additional randomness to the input data. 
Tests and analyses were performed by changing the last bits 
after the operation 𝜃. The above considerations shown the 
dependences and specifically the increase of the Hamming 
weights and the Hamming distances for buffers: “empty” and 
“0123”, to the random equivalent values. Analogous 
characteristics for the buffer “word” remained unchanged. The 
obtained data confirm the theoretical assumption of an increase 
in resistance to attacks using the CP-kernel for small number of 
rounds used in SHA-3. Using such changes in the low round 
number SHA-3 and the algorithms proposed will ensure the 
stability of the hash algorithm in low-performance devices and 
can also prevent the future development of such attacks.  
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